While Recycling Europe condemns any attacks on industrial infrastructure, these disruptions expose the fragility of industrial supply chains globally, and the double standards in how international trade is approached when under pressure.
European ingots & billets leaking towards Asia
Aluminium supply disruptions have driven up prices for aluminium semi-finished products, in particular ingots and billets, reflecting both immediate scarcity and the structural risks of dependence on a single region – notably the Gulf, where abundant and relatively cheap energy supports production – to supply the EU and other Asian regions with semi-finished aluminium products.
In this context, specialised press reports arbitrage by European foundries to “direct sales into Asia (…)” confirming relatively important sales of billets and ingots – produced from recycled aluminium supplied by Recycling Europe members -, from the EU to Japan and other Asian markets. Exports of semi-finished aluminium products from the EU are economically rational at a time when EU demand for certain types of grades remains comparatively low, due to a prolonged slowdown in industrial production in sectors such as automotive or construction, traditionally major aluminium end-markets. However, increased exports of aluminium, classified as ’critical’ and ’strategic’ under the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, do not strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy. The same fallacious and simplistic arguments used to make the case for export restrictions of recycled aluminium scrap could therefore be applied to aluminium products now “leaking” outside the EU.
Potential export restrictions on recycled aluminium: the worst policy option
Recycling Europe firmly opposes export restrictions. Free and fair trade provides industries with a vital buffer to adapt to the fluctuation of supply and demand, currently at an overly fast pace linked to unpredictable geopolitical shocks. This is particularly critical for metal recyclers, whose inputs consist of waste from different end-of-life products – often placed on the market decades ago, such as vehicles. Even with the best available technologies capable of recycling different aluminium alloys, some grades are no longer in demand within the European market. In such cases, exports become imperative to avoid landfilling, or a radical disruption of collection and recycling activities involving aluminium-containing waste streams.
The prolonged industrial slowdown in the EU – largely driven by comparatively prohibitive energy prices – continues to reduce production of certain aluminium products in the EU. As a result, aluminium smelters and foundries often issue “no-buy” policies over time periods that make it impossible for recyclers to stock waste or recycled materials while remaining compliant with their mandatory permit requirements and without taking significant financial risks. This explains why, on average, 80% of the aluminium recycled within the EU is used domestically, as infeed for smelters and foundries to produce new aluminium, while the remaining 20% is exported. As noted above, these exports primarily consist of grades that are no longer in demand within the EU.
Beyond catastrophic socio-economic consequences, export restrictions would create substantial waste management problems that do not currently exist. The mere prospect of such measures is already having tangible negative effects:
- Investments decision are being postponed across the metal recycling sector in the EU; a knock-on effect cannot be excluded, as most recycling technology suppliers are European.
- Companies, including those that have invested in advanced recycling technologies (X-rays, LIBS) are closing.
Towards a coherent trade policy
To provide immediate and short-term support and protection to European aluminium producers, EU policies should primarily focus on leveling the playing field, including through trade defence measures targeting imported aluminium products. It is worth noting that the US has followed this approach, imposing restrictions exclusively on aluminium, while excluding scrap entirely. Any EU trade defence measures should therefore mirror the scope of US measures — both in terms of products and geography — ensuring they remain symmetrical, proportionate and targeted. They should under no circumstances extend to “erga omnes” export restrictions on recycled aluminium ‘scrap’, which is barely exported to the US, according to Eurostat, and has never been subject to export restrictions under Section 232 tariffs, including the latest version of 2 April 2026. In the medium to long term, the priority should be to close the energy price gap that undermines the competitiveness of European industry, by ensuring access to abundant, affordable and low-carbon energy produced in the EU.
